j^aws wrote:professor ganson wrote:...Acid King has a valid point to make, and you seem to be missing it.
I'd like you to explain please? I think I know his point but for clarification?
I don't want to put words in Acid King's mouth and I'm feeling a bit foggy from having a cold and grading papers all day long, but here are some last thoughts.
I assume what we are interested in here is classification (and possibly definition). When we classify things or properties, we do so on the basis of similarities. Now similarity comes in degrees. Some things/properties are exactly alike or at any rate very similar in their causal powers. These are natural kinds, and are suitable for scientific investigation: we can discover laws about them that project to future cases. These divisions in nature are "out there" independent of our interests, and they can be cleanly distinguished from one another on the basis of their very different causal powers.
Differences among videogames, by contrast, are not so neatly distinguished. Take the category of 'shooters' and the many, many subdivisions we devise. The similarities and differences here are not exact similarities; they are very rough and messy. We do not seem to be dealing with natural kinds in the sense I defined earlier (sameness of causal powers). Accordingly, we shouldn't expect that the same sorts of rigorous classifications we have in, say, chemistry will be possible here.
Set theory (and Venn diagrams) are entirely irrelevant here. The members of a set need have no interesting similarities whatsoever.
Let me conclude with a quote from one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, David Lewis. He has some interesting things to say about the natural/unnatural distinction:
"This world, or any possible world, consists of things which instantiate fundamental properties... Few properties are fundamental: the property of being a club or a tub or a pub [a disjunctive kind], for instance, is an UNNATURAL gerrymander, a condition satisfied by miscellaneous things in miscellaneous ways. A fundamental, or “perfectly NATURAL,” property is the extreme opposite. Its instances share exactly some aspect of their intrinsic nature... I hold, as an a priori principle, that every contingent truth must be made true, somehow, by the pattern of coinstantiation of fundamental properties and relations. The whole truth about the world, including the mental part of the world, supervenes on this pattern. If two possible worlds were exactly isomorphic in their patters of coinstantiation of fundamental properties and relations, they would be exactly alike simpliciter.
It is the task of physics to provide an inventory of all the fundamental properties and relations that occur in the world. (That’s because it is also a task of physics to discover the fundamental laws of nature, and only the fundamental properties and relations may appear in the fundamental laws.)"